For architectures implementing CHERI capabilities, introduce a new cheri.h header that defines a few helpers and macros, in addition to what is available in the compiler-provided <cheriintrin.h>.
This header is only meant for code manipulating CHERI capabilities explicitly and expands to nothing if __CHERI__ is not defined.
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CHERI_H is also added to allow architectures to override some of the definitions by providing their own asm/cheri.h.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky kevin.brodsky@arm.com --- arch/Kconfig | 3 ++ include/linux/cheri.h | 122 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ lib/Makefile | 2 + lib/cheri.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 194 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/linux/cheri.h create mode 100644 lib/cheri.c
diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig index afde8a4eeee6..b173a07c5a91 100644 --- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -1376,6 +1376,9 @@ config DYNAMIC_SIGFRAME config HAVE_ARCH_NODE_DEV_GROUP bool
+config ARCH_HAS_CHERI_H + bool + config ARCH_HAS_USER_PTR_H bool
diff --git a/include/linux/cheri.h b/include/linux/cheri.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..aa03edeaeaf9 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/cheri.h @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +#ifndef _LINUX_CHERI_H +#define _LINUX_CHERI_H + +#ifdef __CHERI__ + +#include <cheriintrin.h> + +#include <linux/types.h> + +#include <uapi/asm/cheri.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CHERI_H +#include <asm/cheri.h> +#endif + +/* + * Standard permission sets for new capabilities. Can be overridden by + * architectures to add arch-specific permissions. + */ +#ifndef CHERI_PERMS_READ +#define CHERI_PERMS_READ \ + (CHERI_PERM_LOAD | CHERI_PERM_LOAD_CAP) +#endif + +#ifndef CHERI_PERMS_WRITE +#define CHERI_PERMS_WRITE \ + (CHERI_PERM_STORE | CHERI_PERM_STORE_CAP | CHERI_PERM_STORE_LOCAL_CAP) +#endif + +#ifndef CHERI_PERMS_EXEC +#define CHERI_PERMS_EXEC \ + (CHERI_PERM_EXECUTE | CHERI_PERM_SYSTEM_REGS) +#endif + +#ifndef CHERI_PERMS_ROOTCAP +#define CHERI_PERMS_ROOTCAP \ + (CHERI_PERM_GLOBAL | CHERI_PERM_SW_VMEM) +#endif + +/** + * cheri_build_user_cap() - Create a userspace capability. + * @addr: Requested capability address. + * @len: Requested capability length. + * @perms: Requested capability permissions. + * + * Returns a new capability derived from the root userspace capability. Its + * address and permissions are set according to @addr and @perms respectively. + * Its bounds are set exactly with @addr as base address and @len as length. + * + * The caller is responsible to ensure that: + * 1. @addr is a valid userspace address. + * 2. The (@addr, @len) tuple can be represented as capability bounds. + * 3. @perms are valid permissions for a userspace capability. + * + * If either 1. or 2. does not hold, the resulting capability will be invalid. + * If 3. does not hold, the returned capability will not have any of the invalid + * permissions. + */ +void * __capability +cheri_build_user_cap(ptraddr_t addr, size_t len, cheri_perms_t perms); + +/** + * cheri_build_user_cap_inexact_bounds() - Create a userspace capability, + * allowing bounds to be enlarged. + * @addr: Requested capability address. + * @len: Requested capability length. + * @perms: Requested capability permissions. + * + * Returns a new capability derived from the root userspace capability. Its + * address and permissions are set according to @addr and @perms respectively. + * Its bounds are set to the smallest representable range that includes the + * range [@addr, @addr + @len[. + * + * This variant of cheri_build_user_cap() should only be used when it is safe to + * enlarge the bounds of the capability. In particular, it should never be used + * when creating a capability that is to be provided to userspace, because the + * potentially enlarged bounds might give access to unrelated objects. + * + * The caller is responsible to ensure that: + * 1. @addr is a valid userspace address. + * 2. @perms are valid permissions for a userspace capability. + * + * If 1. does not hold, the resulting capability will be invalid. + * If 2. does not hold, the returned capability will not have any of the invalid + * permissions. + */ +void * __capability +cheri_build_user_cap_inexact_bounds(ptraddr_t addr, size_t len, + cheri_perms_t perms); + + +/** + * cheri_check_cap_data_access() - Check whether a capability gives access to a + * range of addresses. + * @cap: Capability to check. + * @len: Length of the access. + * @perms: Required permissions. + * + * Returns true if the capability gives access to a given range of addresses + * and has the requested permissions. This means that: + * * @cap is valid and unsealed. + * * The range [@cap.address, @cap.address + @len[ is within the bounds + * of @cap. + * * The permissions of @cap include at least @perms. + */ +bool cheri_check_cap_data_access(void * __capability cap, size_t len, + cheri_perms_t perms); + + +/* + * Root capabilities. Should be set in arch code during the early init phase, + * read-only after that. + * + * The helpers above should be used instead where possible. + */ +extern uintcap_t cheri_root_cap_userspace; +extern uintcap_t cheri_root_seal_cap_userspace; +extern uintcap_t cheri_root_cid_cap_userspace; + +#endif /* __CHERI__ */ + +#endif /* _LINUX_CHERI_H */ diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile index 6b9ffc1bd1ee..8dd8c00fee31 100644 --- a/lib/Makefile +++ b/lib/Makefile @@ -263,6 +263,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_MEMREGION) += memregion.o obj-$(CONFIG_STMP_DEVICE) += stmp_device.o obj-$(CONFIG_IRQ_POLL) += irq_poll.o
+obj-y += cheri.o + # stackdepot.c should not be instrumented or call instrumented functions. # Prevent the compiler from calling builtins like memcmp() or bcmp() from this # file. diff --git a/lib/cheri.c b/lib/cheri.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4fe8e9e7f72c --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/cheri.c @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +#ifdef __CHERI__ + +#include <linux/bug.h> +#include <linux/cheri.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> + +uintcap_t cheri_root_cap_userspace __ro_after_init; +uintcap_t cheri_root_seal_cap_userspace __ro_after_init; +uintcap_t cheri_root_cid_cap_userspace __ro_after_init; + +static void * __capability +build_user_cap(ptraddr_t addr, size_t len, cheri_perms_t perms, bool exact_bounds) +{ + void * __capability ret = (void * __capability)cheri_root_cap_userspace; + cheri_perms_t root_perms = cheri_perms_get(ret); + + ret = cheri_perms_and(ret, perms); + ret = cheri_address_set(ret, addr); + + if (exact_bounds) + ret = cheri_bounds_set_exact(ret, len); + else + ret = cheri_bounds_set(ret, len); + + WARN(perms & ~root_perms, + "Permission mask %#lx discarded while creating user capability %#lp\n", + perms & ~root_perms, ret); + WARN(cheri_is_invalid(ret), + "Invalid user capability created: %#lp (%s bounds requested)\n", + ret, (exact_bounds ? "exact" : "inexact")); + + return ret; +} + +void * __capability +cheri_build_user_cap(ptraddr_t addr, size_t len, cheri_perms_t perms) +{ + return build_user_cap(addr, len, perms, true); +} + +void * __capability +cheri_build_user_cap_inexact_bounds(ptraddr_t addr, size_t len, + cheri_perms_t perms) +{ + return build_user_cap(addr, len, perms, false); +} + +bool cheri_check_cap_data_access(void * __capability cap, size_t len, + cheri_perms_t perms) +{ + ptraddr_t addr = untagged_addr(cheri_address_get(cap)); + ptraddr_t base = cheri_base_get(cap); /* Never tagged */ + + if (cheri_is_invalid(cap) || cheri_is_sealed(cap)) + return false; + + if (addr < base || addr > base + cheri_length_get(cap) - len) + return false; + + if (perms & ~cheri_perms_get(cap)) + return false; + + return true; +} + +#endif /* __CHERI__ */